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Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade
Commission Before the Committee on the
Judiciary, United States House of
Representatives, Concerning H.R. 1304
the "Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of
1999"
June 22, 1999
Presented by
Robert Pitofsky, Chairman'
Federal Trade Commission
Mr. Chairman, the Federal Trade Commission thanks you and
the members of the Committee for inviting us again this year to
present the Commission's views on a proposed antitrust exemption to
allow physicians and other health care professionals to engage in
collective bargaining with health plans. The basic effect of this year's
bill is the same as last year's proposal: to grant independent health
care practitioners the right to agree on the fees and other terms that
they will accept from insurers, employers, and other third party payers, and to boycott payers who refuse to accept their demands. This
year's version, however, makes clear that the immunity would apply
not just to doctors, but also to pharmacists and others who supply
health care products or services. The Commission continues to believe
that such an exemption would be bad medicine for consumers. The
issues that have been raised regarding patient protection are vitally
important, but this proposal is not the way to address them.
H.R. 1304 would create a broad antitrust exemption that would,
for example, allow all of the physicians in a particular medical specialty in an area to demand a 20% increase in fees and to refuse to
contract with any insurer who refused to pay those rates. The example
mentioned above is not a mere hypothetical. The Commission's staff
currently has an investigation into just such conduct. Nor is this an
isolated case. The Commission has brought numerous actions challenging similar activities.2
The bill, while appealing in its apparent simplicity, threatens to
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cause serious harm to consumers, to employers, and to federal, state,
and local governments:
* Doctors and other health care professionals could join together to
demand substantially higher fees.
* Pharmacists could insist on higher payments for filling prescriptions. The bill apparently would permit even large chain pharmacies, such as CVS and Rite Aid, to get together and demand higher
prices.
* Consumers and employers, including government employers,
would face higher insurance premiums.
* Consumers would pay more out-of-pocket and could see their
benefits reduced.
* Medicaid programs that provide services through managed care
plans could be forced to increase their budgets or reduce services.
* The number of uninsured Americans, and the costs borne by state
and local governments in providing for their care, could increase
significantly.
Supporters of the bill argue that giving this kind of unrestrained
power to private competitors is needed because of concerns about the
changes taking place in our nation's health care system. That significant changes are occurring is beyond dispute. Efforts by private employers and government health care programs to address rapidly
increasing health care costs have transformed health service markets.
Many doctors are concerned about their ability to care for their patients
in the way they believe is best. Many patients are dissatisfied with the
services they have received from their health plans; others are worried
about the availability and quality of services should they become
seriously ill. Press reports of apparent abusive practices by some health
plans abound. But even though there are serious problems concerning
the relationship of HMOs and other health plans to doctors and patients that deserve to be addressed, this proposal is the wrong approach.
What do we mean by this? An across-the-board antitrust exemption
would allow all doctors in a community or all members of a particular
specialty - for example, specialists already compensated at $150,000 to
$200,000 a year, not to mention pharmacists who work for large corporate pharmacies - to band together and insist that they be paid an
additional 10 or 20%. Although H.R. 1304 is presented as an extension
of the antitrust immunity granted to labor organizations, the circumstances here are surely very different from the context in which the
labor exemption was originally adopted by Congress.
The Commission's opposition to the proposed exemption is not
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based on any policy preference for HMOs over fee-for-service medicine, or on an assumption that the market, if left alone, will cure all
problems. Nor does it reflect a lack of concern about the special characteristics of health care markets, or disregard for the strong sense of
responsibility that medical practitioners feel for the welfare of their
patients. Rather, our opposition is based on the Commission's experience investigating the impact on consumers of numerous instances of
collective bargaining by independent health care practitioners.
The bill's stated purpose is to promote the quality of patient care.
Collective bargaining by health care professionals, however, does not
ensure better care for patients. Two broad-based commissions recently
studied changes in the health care system and recommended numerous measures to protect consumers and promote quality. But neither
suggested that antitrust immunity was appropriate or desirable. The
Commission believes that measures designed to increase the power of
consumer choice will serve patients, and our nation as a whole, far
better than giving providers the collective power to dictate what
choices - and, significantly, what prices - will be available in the
marketplace. Government can play an important role in creating the
conditions for effective competition in health care markets, and in
addressing specific abuses through targeted regulation.
I. The Bill Would Grant Broad Antitrust Immunity For Price Fixing,
Boycotts, And Other Anticompetitive Conduct
H.R. 1304, like the proposal before the Committee last year,
would create a broad antitrust exemption for price fixing and boycotts
by physicians, dentists, pharmacists, and other health care professionals. To understand the types of activity that this bill would legalize,
one need only refer to the record of antitrust law enforcement over the
past two decades. The Commission, the Department of Justice, and
state attorneys general have brought numerous actions challenging
price fixing and boycotts by health care professionals who sought to
obtain higher fees or more favorable reimbursement terms from third
party payers. For example, the Commission's early case against the
Michigan State Medical Society 4 challenged the Society's formation of
a "negotiating committee" that orchestrated boycotts of the state Blue
Shield plan and the state Medicaid program in order to promote the
reimbursement policies that the Society preferred. Among other things,
the Society opposed vision and hearing care benefits plans negotiated
by the United Auto Workers union, because these programs provided
for different reimbursement levels for participating and nonparticipatVolume 12, Number 1 1999

Loyola Consumer Law Review

ing providers.5
More recently, the Commission issued a consent order settling
charges that a group of physicians in Danville, Virginia, agreed on
reimbursement rates and other terms of dealing with third-party
payers, agreed to boycott payers that did not meet those terms, and
thereby succeeded in obstructing the entry of new health care plans
into its area.6 One of the victims of the boycott was a health plan established by Virginia to cover state employees. The Commonwealth of
Virginia jointly investigated the case with FTC staff, and collected
$170,000 in penalties and damages for the increased costs it had to bear
7
in providing health benefits to its employees.
The Commission's most recent challenge to providers' collective
negotiation with health plans involved a group of independent physicians that included between 70 and 80% of the doctors in the Lake
Tahoe area. According to the complaint, the doctors negotiated collectively with all health plans in the area, and forced the plans to either
accept rates much higher than those paid in other parts of California or
Nevada, or abandon plans to contract with doctors in the area. The
physicians asked Blue Shield of California to raise its premiums to
fund increased payments to doctors, and concertedly terminated their
participation agreements with Blue Shield when it did not comply with
8
their demands.
These are just a few examples of actions antitrust enforcers have
blocked - actions that meant higher prices for consumers without any
guarantee of improved patient care. There are many more.9 The immediate effect of H.R. 1304 would be to allow such anticompetitive conduct to proceed unchallenged, and it may encourage health care professionals to undertake such actions.
The bill also could permit physicians to collectively demand
terms from health plans that would disadvantage allied health care
providers or other alternatives to prevailing modes of medical practice.
The collective judgment of health care professionals concerning what
patients should want can differ markedly from what patients themselves are asking for in the marketplace. The Commission has taken
enforcement action in cases in which provider groups sought to impede practice by competing alternatives by, for example, denying,
delaying, or limiting hospital privileges of non-physician providers 0
or physicians providing services through innovative arrangements,
such as the Cleveland Clinic's integrated multi-specialty group practice." Other cases illustrate how groups of professionals have attempted to secure health plan payment policies that disadvantage their
competitors.12 Although it was suggested at last year's hearing that the
Loyola Consumer Law Review

Volume 12, Number

legislation would not grant antitrust immunity to agreements between
doctors and health plans that disadvantaged competing providers, but
would protect only agreements among physicians on what terms they
will accept from plans, it is not clear that the courts would interpret the
3
law in that way.
The differences between this year's bill and last year's do nothing to reduce the Commission's concerns about the potential harm to
consumers. Indeed, the changes primarily broaden rather than limit
the bill's scope. The current version includes an expansive definition of
"health care professional" that appears designed to encompass a
sweeping array of individuals who provide health care products or
services. This year's bill also makes clear that state, as well as federal,
antitrust enforcement would be displaced. In addition, although the
current bill excludes the "collective cessation of service to patients"
from its protections, this limitation takes virtually nothing away from
the coercive power the bill grants to providers. The bill continues to
permit physicians and others to collectively refuse to deal with a health
plan that refuses their demands for higher fees. If a plan failed to
accede to those demands, and the group refused to contract, the plan
could be forced from the market, 14 or patients would be left to pay
their medical bills out of their own pockets. 5 Thus, although providers
could not collectively refuse to treat patients, their collective refusal to
contract with a plan could impose formidable financial obstacles to
patients seeking care.
Although styled as a labor exemption, the antitrust immunity
that H.R. 1304 would confer has little to do with established labor law
and policy. The labor exemption already applies to health care professionals under the same standards that apply in other sectors of the
economy; that is, physicians who are employees (for example, of hospitals) are already covered by the labor exemption under current law.
The labor exemption, however, is limited to the employer-employee
context, and it does not protect combinations of independent business
people. 6 H.R. 1304 is designed to override the distinction Congress
drew in the labor laws between employees and independent contractors, and to allow some independent contractors - doctors and other
health care professionals operating as independent businesses - to
collectively exert economic pressure on health plans to gain higher fees
and other, more favorable, terms of dealing. 7 In addition, it grants the
exemption without providing for any oversight of the collective bargaining process by the National Labor Relations Board.
Moreover, this extension of the labor exemption is being offered
as a way to remedy matters that collective bargaining was never inVolume 12, Number 1 1999
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tended to address. The stated goal of this bill is to promote the quality
of patient care. The labor exemption, however, was not created to solve
issues regarding the ultimate quality of products or services that consumers receive. Collective bargaining rights are designed to raise the
incomes and improve working conditions of union members. The law
protects the United Auto Workers' right to bargain for higher wages
and better working conditions, but we do not rely on the UAW to
bargain for safer cars. Congress addressed those concerns in other
ways. The patient care issues raised by supporters of the bill deserve
serious attention, but an ill-fitting labor exemption is the wrong approach.
II. The Exemption Would Harm Consumers
It is undisputed that the immediate effect of H.R. 1304 would be
to permit all doctors in a community - indeed, all health care professionals - to bargain collectively with all health plans that contract with
independent health practitioners. It would permit those practitioners
to demand much higher fees for their services, and to refuse collectively to contract with plans that did not meet those demands. What is
disputed is the impact the bill would have on consumers.
At last year's hearing, there was much discussion about
hypotheticals and theoretically-possible results. The Commission
believes, however, that past experience is a more reliable guide to what
is likely to happen when health care practitioners collectively bargain
with health plans. That experience suggests that the proposed exemption presents substantial risks of harm to consumers, private and
governmental purchasers of health care, and taxpayers who ultimately
foot the bill for government-sponsored health care programs.
A. The Exemption Would Raise Costs And Threatens To Reduce Access To
Care
Without antitrust enforcement to block price fixing and boycotts
designed to increase health plan payments to health care professionals,
we can expect prices for health care services to rise substantially.
Health plans would have few alternatives to accepting the collective
demands of health care providers for higher fees. The effect of the bill,
however, would not simply be on the health plans and employers that
are forced to pay higher prices to health care practitioners, but can be
expected to extend to various parties, and in various ways, throughout
the health care system:
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*
*
*
*

Consumers and employers would face higher prices for health
insurance coverage.
Consumers also would face higher out-of-pocket expenses as
copayments and other unreimbursed expenses increased.
Consumers might face a reduction in benefits as costs increased.
Senior citizens participating in Medicare HMOs would face re-

duced benefits, because Medicare pays these HMOs a fixed amount
per enrollee. Higher fees for professional services means health
plans would have fewer dollars available to pay for prescription
drug coverage and other benefits that are not available under
traditional Medicare but currently are provided by many Medicare
HMOs.
* The federal government would pay more for health coverage for its
employees through the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program and military health programs.
* State and local governments would incur higher costs to provide
health benefits to their
employees.
* State Medicaid programs attempting to use managed care strategies
to serve their beneficiaries could have to increase their budgets, cut
optional benefits, or reduce the number of beneficiaries covered.
* State and local programs providing care for the uninsured would
be further strained, because, by making health insurance coverage
more costly, the bill threatens to increase the already sizable portion
of the population that is uninsured.
These widespread effects are not simply theoretical possibilities.
The record of antitrust law enforcement sets forth the impact of collective "negotiations" on the public. For example, as described in the
Commission's complaints, collective bargaining by anesthesiologists in
Rochester, New York, and by obstetricians in Jacksonville, Florida,
forced health plans to raise their reimbursement, and the result was
increased premiums for the HMOs' subscribers." Other cases have
challenged actions by associations of pharmacists who succeeded in
forcing state and local governments to raise reimbursement levels paid
under their employee prescription drug plans. 19 In one such case, an
administrative law judge found that the collective fee demands of
pharmacists cost the State of New York an estimated $7 million.20
By raising health care costs and making health insurance less affordable, the exemption threatens to increase the number of uninsured
and thus reduce access to care. A 1997 report by the General Accounting Office concluded that a major reason for declining private health
coverage is the rising cost of health insurance. Higher insurance costs
Volume 12, Number 1 1999
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affect employers' decisions whether to offer health benefits and employees' decisions whether to purchase coverage. 2 In a country where
43.4 million people did not have health insurance in 1997 (1.7 million
more than in 1996), any development that threatens to increase the
proportion of the population that is uninsured is cause for serious
concern.
B. There Is No Support For Claims That Consumer Costs Would Not Increase
In last year's hearing there was acknowledgment that passage of
the bill could result in higher payments to health professionals. There
has been a suggestion that fee increases imposed on health plans might
not be passed on to consumers, but could simply reduce health plan
profits. Such a result is unlikely. Fees for professional services account
for almost one-half of private insurance payments for health services
and supplies.22 If these costs increase significantly, the most logical
assumption is that costs to consumers would go up substantially.
Relying on an assumption that higher costs will not be passed on to
consumers puts consumers at risk of serious harm. Economic theory
predicts that a significant industry-wide increase in input costs will
ordinarily raise the price of the final product.2 3 Moreover, as noted
above, our enforcement actions provide numerous examples in which
health care professionals' collective demands for higher fees resulted in
higher costs to consumers and to government purchasers.
Arguments that consumers would not be harmed by an antitrust
exemption for collective bargaining by independent health care professionals appear to rest on assertions that the bill would balance the
bargaining power between health care professionals and health plans.
These assertions, however, are incorrect. The bill would permit doctors
to create monopolies. On the health plan side of the ledger, the evidence does not support the suggestion that most (or even many) areas
have only one or two health plans. A November 1998 letter to Chairman Hyde from Chairman Pitofsky discussed in greater length than is
possible here the available information on the extent to which health
plans have market power in individual geographic areas. That information indicates that health plan markets vary widely, and simply
does not support suggestions that most markets have little or no health
plan competition. For example, individual HMOs typically face considerable competition from other HMOs.24 Data on HMO penetration
published in June 1998 show that areas in which HMOs as a group
have the largest collective market share tend to have a larger number
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of individual HMOs in operation and more competitive HMO markets.25 Of course, HMOs also face competition from other types of
26
health plans, such as preferred provider organizations ("PPOs").
Nor does the recent number of highly publicized mergers among
commercial health plans suggest that most markets are likely to have
only one or two health plans in the future. The Commission and the
Department of Justice review these transactions, and we have investigated those that appeared to raise competitive concerns. The Commission is committed to preserving competition in the market for health
plans, as in all markets, and if a proposed transaction appeared likely
to create market power, we would challenge it.
Arguments about equalizing bargaining power also rest on unsupported assertions that the McCarran-Ferguson Act gives insurance
companies leverage in bargaining with health care professionals.
Although McCarran-Ferguson protects certain types of activities by
insurers (to the extent that such activity is regulated by state law), the
Supreme Court has held an insurance company's agreements with
providers on the fees they will be paid are not "the business of insur27
ance" and thus are not covered by the McCarran-Ferguson immunity.
It seems clear, therefore, that collusion among insurers on such agreements likewise would not be protected by the Act. In fact, complaints
about health plans wielding power over doctors appear to have nothing to do with McCarran-Ferguson or with any statutorily-protected
collusion among insurers. We know of no evidence of insurers
colluding in setting fees or other terms of dealing with providers, and
the Commission does not believe that McCarran would protect such
conduct. Rather, the complaints revolve around the size and power of
individual insurers relative to individual health professionals.
There is undoubtedly a bargaining imbalance between an individual physician in solo practice and an insurance company. Bargaining imbalances between parties to a commercial transaction are not
uncommon in our economy. But the suggestion that this bill would not
impose higher costs on consumers and others - on the ground that
the exemption would merely create a countervailing monopoly - is
premised on theoretical arguments about market conditions that do
not describe most health care markets. These speculative arguments
provide no assurance that the bill's effect would not be a dramatic
inflation in health care costs.
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C. No Antitrust Exemption Is Needed To Allow ProfessionalSocieties And
Others To Discuss Their Concerns About Actions By Health Plans
In the debate over this proposed exemption, we frequently hear
arguments that the antitrust laws prevent physicians from being effective advocates for their patients. Indeed, it is often suggested that any
effort by physicians to talk among themselves or with plans about
concerns regarding health plans' practices would violate the antitrust
laws. That is simply not the case. Health care professionals can and do
engage in collective advocacy, both to promote the interests of their
patients and to express their opinions about other issues, such as
payment delays, dispute resolution procedures, and other matters.
Health care associations have traditionally played an active role in
lobbying legislatures and regulatory bodies, such as state insurance
commissions, and presenting issues to the media and the public.
Moreover, the antitrust laws do not prohibit medical societies and
other groups from engaging in collective discussions with health plans
regarding issues of patient care. Among other things, physicians may
collectively explain to a health plan why they think a particular policy
or practice is medically unsound, and may present medical or scientific
data to support their views.28 In fact, physician groups have presented
their views on a number of issues to payers. For example, the American Medical Association has issued a Model Medical Services Agreement that explains its views on appropriate contract terms and on why
other contract terms are inappropriate or harmful. Recent press reports
indicate that Aetna U.S. Healthcare has altered some of its contract
terms in response to communications from the American Medical
29
Association concerning physician dissatisfaction with the contracts.
The Commission has never brought a case based on physicians' collective advocacy with a health plan on an issue involving patient care.
Our cases have addressed instances in which physician groups (1)
negotiated collectively on fee levels or other price-related issues, or (2)
collectively refused to contract with plans, either to gain acceptance of
their price-related demands or to prevent or delay market entry by
managed care plans generally. In all such cases, the Commission has
been very careful to make sure that its orders do not interfere with the
legitimate exchange of information and views between health plans
and health care practitioners. Indeed, in the Commission's first litigated case involving collective negotiations by physicians - Michigan
State Medical Society - the opinion emphasized that the antitrust laws
do not prohibit health care providers' collective provision of information and views to health plans. 30 Specific language was inserted in that
Loyola Consumer Law Review
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order, and in subsequent orders, to make it clear that bans on
anticompetitive agreements among competing providers do not prohibit the provision of information and views to health plans concern31
ing any issue, including reimbursement.
III. There Are Better Ways To Protect Consumers
For all the reasons set forth above, the Commission believes the
proposed antitrust exemption is the wrong approach to solving concerns about patient care, and that it threatens serious harm to
consumers. The Commission recognizes the serious concerns that have
been raised regarding the current operation of health care markets. We
do not suggest that the market is performing as well as it could, or that
the market can or will cure all of the problems that concern this Committee. But recent efforts to examine health care markets, such as the
President's Advisory Commission onConsumer Protection and Quality
in the Health Care Industry, have produced a variety of concrete
proposals for reform. As antitrust enforcers, we do not seek to endorse
any specific proposal. We note, however, that these studies recommend
a number of ways to improve quality and protect consumers, and they
do not recommend antitrust immunity or collective bargaining rights
forproviders. Proposals for reform include:
A. Increasing Consumers' Ability To Choose Their Health Plan.
A fundamental concern expressed by health policymakers and by members of this Committee at last year's hearing - is that
many consumers lack a choice among different types of health plans.
Most consumers obtain health care coverage as a benefit of employment, and many employers offer only one plan. Consumers have
different views about many aspects of health care service delivery,
including the types of settings in which they want to receive health
care, the kinds of services and health practitioners to which they want
access, how much they are willing to pay for health insurance, and the
value they attach to broader choices among providers.32 Offering
consumers a choice can help make health plans more responsive to
consumer preferences. Consumer choice can be increased, for example,
by regulatory changes making it easier for small employers to participate in purchasing pools that can offer individuals a choice of health
plans.33
Increased consumer choice among health plans also would be
good for doctors. Patients who can choose among plans are less likely
Volume 12, Number 1 1999
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to have to switch doctors when the employer changes the health plan
that is offered, with the result that doctors likely would feel less pressure to participate in a large number of plans in order to retain access
to their patients.
B. Improving Consumer Information.
Several proposals would require health plans to disclose various
kinds of information, including limits on coverage, use of drug formularies, how procedures and drugs are deemed experimental, and the
types and extent of dispute resolution procedures. In addition, work
also is underway to develop ways of presenting consumers with comprehensive comparative quality and performance information about
health plans, to better inform their decision-making. 34
The Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection has been
active in efforts to improve the information available to consumers
through a federal interagency task force on health care quality (the
Quality Interagency Coordinating Task Force). The consumer information committee of this group is working on ways to improve the information that federal health care plans disclose to consumers, and is
considering the types of information that should be disclosed, the way
the information should be communicated, and development of a
common terminology.35 The Commission's staff is considering other
ways that the Commission can help improve the quantity and quality
of information about health plans available to consumers.
C. Regulation of Plan Behavior.
Targeted regulation of certain aspects of health plan behavior
may be appropriate in some cases to protect consumers. Numerous
bills addressing such things as patients' access to appeal and review
mechanisms are under consideration at both the state and federal
levels.
The Commission appreciates the desire to avoid detailed federal
regulation of health plan behavior and to rely instead on the market.
However, the proposed exemption would not let the market work. On
the contrary, it would severely limit competition among health professionals and health plans, without any regulatory oversight or other
mechanism to protect the public interest.
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III. Conclusion
There are no easy solutions to the problems inherent in the
simultaneous pursuit of cost effectiveness, high quality, and wider
access to health care services. But allowing doctors and other health
care practitioners to fix prices and other contract terms is not the answer. The Commission continues to believe that competition among
health care providers and among health plans is an important tool for
controlling costs, providing consumer choice, and promoting innovation and high quality. We counsel strongly against abandonment of
competition as a mechanism for promoting a better health care system,
and we urge that every effort be made to address concerns about
quality and patient care while preserving and strengthening the benefits that competition can provide. The Commission stands ready to
help in any way it can.
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14. Some types of plans are required as a condition of licensure to maintain a network of
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